How to understand every position taken (including Rand's) in the Realism-Nominalism debate (Difficulty Level: Advanced)

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This essay serves 3 purposes:

1) Identification of the distinct positions taken in the Realism-Nominalism debate
2) Identification of Rand's (implicit) position in this debate
3) Final resolution of the "Problem of Universals" (by creating an understanding so clear and sufficient that the problem is decisively transcended)
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Background

"Universals are features (e.g., redness or tallness) shared by many individuals, each of which is said to instantiate or exemplify the universal. Although it began with dispute over the status of Platonic Forms, the problem of universals became a central concern during the middle ages. The metaphysical issue is whether or not these features exist independently of the particular things that have them: realists hold that they do; nominalists hold that they do not; conceptualists hold that they do so only mentally."1


Background Summary

Human thought requires regarding universals as "shared features." Questions or disputes regarding the fact of their existence, taken along with those regarding the nature of any affirmed existence, will altogether exhaust the available positions. There are 4 options regarding the precise genesis of universals. They may be taken to have no instantiation (nominalism); instantiation in entities (realism); instantiation in a particular mind (classic conceptualism); instantiation that is inherent in the MODE of interaction between reality and ANY human mind (intentional conceptualism). The possible positions are summarized below:

A. No existence of shared features (no universals): "nominalism"
B. Shared features in the ontological sense (extra-mental; entity-instantiated): "realism"
C. Shared features in the subjective (objects in the mind) sense: "classical conceptualism"
D. Shared features in the intentional (objective) sense: "intentional conceptualism"

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Who's who (in this debate)?

*4 questions (utilizing 4 modes: non-existence + 3 existences) that, when taken together, sufficiently delineate all available positions.

1. Do universals exist?

**If yes, proceed to question 2;

**if no, you're a cursed nominalist - you may have "trouble" communicating with others as your words have no objective "meaning" - seek psychiatric help if the situation warrants


2. Are universals extra-mental (an existence independent of thought)?

**If yes, you're a cursed ontological realist - probably one of those Scholastic types - go read some more Plato and give away any books by Aristotle, and especially those of Rand;

**if no, proceed to question 3


3. Are universals located in the mind (as the "content" of cognition)?

**If yes, you're a cursed, classical conceptualist - probably one with an arbitrarily invented "criterion of classification" - one who thinks that "units exist qua units" and not solely as "things viewed by a consciousness in certain existing relationships"2 - you probably don't believe that "[t]he conceptual classification of newly discovered existents depends on the nature and extent of their differences from and similarities to the previously known existents."3 ;

**if no, proceed to question 4


4. Are universals merely the form in which humans conceptualize (as the "mode" of cognition)?

**If yes, congratulations! You're an "intentional conceptualist" - the type of thinker Rand was, though she never explicitly stated it in such sufficiently illustrative terms - you realize that "units are things viewed by a consciousness in certain existing relationshps" and that "units do not exist qua units" either in your mind OR outside of it - you realize that units have existence by way of THE INTERACTION of a mind with reality (they're not in the mind or out in reality; they are in the relation of mind to reality;

**if no, you're probably a shifty, post-modern relativist, taking pains to avoid the explicit identification of anything important to humans, probably because of the frightening personal "responsibility to think" that these identifications entail - go rent all of Michael Moore's films and have a movie marathon with a popcorn-bowl full of litely-salted Prozac pills and some diet-soda with double aspartame

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Final note on this new term for an "old" (Randian) type of conceptualism: "intentional" (In order to clarify exactly what "intentional" means in this context).

"Intentional existence is not independent of the human mind, but it is also not dependent on the existence of any one individual mind, as subjective existence is.

Objects that exist for two or more minds, objects that they can discuss with each other, have intentional existence. If there were no minds on earth, there would be no objects that had intentional existence. To summarize this middle ground between real existence and mental existence. It consists in (1) not being dependent on the acts of any particular human mind, and in this respect it differs from subjective existence. And (2) not being independent of the human mind in general, and in this respect it differs from real existence. It is a mode of existence that depends on there being some individual minds at work."4


Conclusion

The quote above (regarding intentional existences) decisively captures Rand's stance, albeit in terms she didn't explicitly use (this clearly categorizes her thought under the newly differentiated position in the ordinal scale: intentional conceptualism). What is remarkably evident is that the intentional existence of concepts is what makes communication possible (acknowledging this position in the scale is necessary to explain, without the contradictions of the other positions, how it is that we can communicate about reality). This occurs because of the "public" nature deriving from the inherent objectivity of proper concept formation (what is subjective is private; what is objective is the same for all). Reality is continuous, but human minds must delineate (due to cognitive limitations, we cannot treat each of the trillions of entities on an individual basis).

In sum, universals don't exist independently, but (human) thinking makes it so. This solves the "Problem" and illuminates Rand's position, putting it in a explicit perspective with regard to the other possible positions.

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Reference:
1. [online] Philosophy Pages (link to dictionary). Accessed 30 Jun 2004.
Available:< http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/index.htm>
2. Rand, Ayn. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. page 7
3. ibid. page 73
4. [online] Adler On - Topical Index to the Works of Mortimer J. Adler (link to "Being"). Accessed 30 Jun 2004. Available:< http://www.thegreatideas.org/apd-bein.html>